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Abstract
In Japan, the “soft budget problem,” by which banks loosen their lending stances
toward long-term client firms despite worsening business conditions, has attracted
attention particularly in connection to so-called “zombie firms,” financially weak firms
sustained by discounted interest rates and evergreen lending which have become a
major research and political interest in recent years. In this paper, we focus on zombie
firms among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a corporate category that has
hitherto received less consideration in the discussion about Japan's zombie firms. We
find that: (1) many zombie firms exist among SMEs; (2) some zombie firms eventually
emerge from zombie status; (3) once a firm becomes a zombie, its probability of exit
increases especially among SMEs; and (4) the economic performance of exiting zombie
firms is worse than those of exiting non-zombie firms.
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I. Introduction
So-called “zombie firms” have been widely discussed as a key factor in Japan’s
sluggish economic growth in the past two decades, a period commonly known as the
“lost decades.” Zombie firms are generally defined as insolvent businesses that remain
in the marketplace instead of pursuing restructuring or bankruptcy. First reported by
journalists in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Henry 1997; Chandler 1999; Landers 1999;
Fackler 2003), zombie firms were subsequently criticized by economists, who argued
that they distorted market competition and hurt healthy firms by depressing profits and
discouraging investment, and thereby hindered Japan’s macroeconomic revitalization
(Hoshi 2006; Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008; Hoshi and Kashyap 2011). Since the global
financial crisis, Japan’s encounter with zombie firms has become a cautionary lesson
for other recessed economies seeking to avoid long-term stagnation, and policymakers
in places as varied as the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Commission
and China have expressed a strong desire to stop the spread of zombie firms (Summers
2012; Bank of England 2012; Stothard 2013; Zhongguo xinwen wang 2015).
While the notion of zombie firms has gained international prominence because of
Japan’s experience, recent questions about conceptualization have reopened the debate
about these firms’ precise role in Japan’s post-bubble economy. Most notably,
challengers of the dominant zombie firm argument have asserted that these firms should
conceptually include the criteria of profitability and evergreen lending (Fukuda and
Nakamura 2011; Nakamura and Fukuda 2013), in addition to the criterion of discounted
interest payments used in earlier studies (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008).
Measurement with this revised definition suggests that the ratio of zombie firms in fact
declined from the early 2000s, meaning that zombie firms did not persist in significant
numbers throughout the 2000s, and thus do not explain Japan’s low growth in the latter
part of the lost decades.
We are interested in this ongoing debate surrounding zombie firms, not just for its
significance to understanding Japan’s lost decades, but also for its relevance to other
economies concerned about zombie firms’ allegedly malefic effects and keen to learn
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from Japan’s experience. However, we believe that the current scholarship on zombie
firms in Japan suffers from a key deficiency. Namely, it primarily focuses on stock
exchange-listed firms that tend to be large-sized enterprises, and overlooks the presence
of zombie firms among small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), the corporate
category that actually represents the majority of Japanese businesses.
In this paper, we examine the presence of zombie firms among small firms in
Japan during the lost decades. Our contribution is twofold. First, we employ firm-level
data from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s Basic Survey of Japanese
Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) to assess the existence of zombie firms
among Japanese SME. Our use of this database allows us to make a relatively broad
inference about the zombie ratio among small firms, which is an improvement over
earlier studies that examined the ratio with a limited sample size (Imai 2016). Second, we
explore corporate characteristics of these firms, including duration of zombie status,
market exit, and employment and sales activity at the time of exit. Our findings about
these characteristics add refinement to the debate about zombie firms, since there has
hitherto been little attention to important zombie attributes like survival time, with the
recent exception of Nakamura (2017). Consequently, they suggest issues for
consideration in future research on this topic.
We find that: (1) many zombie firms exist among SME; (2) some zombie SME
eventually emerge from zombie status; (3) once a firm becomes a zombie, its
probability of exit increases especially among SME; and (4) the economic performance
of exiting zombie firms is worse than that of exiting non-zombies. These results carry
considerable generalizability for the broader population of Japanese SME, given their
origin in BSJBSA micro-data covering a wide range of firm sizes and behaviors.
The paper is structured in the following way. In the “Literature Review” section,
we revisit the debate on zombie firms in Japan and elsewhere, to show why SME should
be investigated for zombie firms. In the “Theory” section, we offer a hypothesis for why
the SME category may exhibit a high ratio of zombie firms, focusing on the role of
Japan’s credit guarantee system in supporting weak firms’ access to financing. In the
“Data and Method” section, we describe the merits of the quantitative database from
which we draw our sample of SME for analysis, and outline our paper’s empirical
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strategy. In the “Results” section, we quantitatively assess the level of zombies and their
corporate characteristics. In the “Conclusion” section, we summarize our findings and
discuss their implications for understanding Japan’s lost decades and the wider study of
zombie firms.
II. Survey
Zombie firms have long been associated with Japan’s lost decades. Initially identified in
the late 1990s and early 2000s by journalists who labeled prominent overleveraged
firms like Yamaichi Securities and Daiei as “zombies” (Henry 1997; Wehrfritz and
Takayama 2002), zombie firms became a distinct topic of academic study in the 2000s,
when economists noted a wider trend of insolvent businesses that were kept alive by
various forms of financial support, instead of being forced to undergo corporate
restructuring or liquidation (Katz 2003). Early studies of Japan’s post-bubble economy
showed that increased lending to highly indebted firms lowered their profitability
(Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita 2003), and that industries with high concentrations of
zombie firms had weak productivity performance (Ahearne and Shinada 2005), suggesting
that zombie firms negatively affected Japan’s economic recovery. Studies also
demonstrated that Japanese banks’ nonperforming loan problems made it more likely
for them to give credit to financially-troubled firms, implying that zombie firms
received life support in a perverse process of “unnatural selection” that simultaneously
reduced the credit available to normal borrowers (Peek and Rosengren 2005).
Zombie firms’ malefic role in Japan’s stagnation was most explicitly and
influentially asserted by Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) (henceforth “CHK”), who
measured the prevalence of zombie firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1981
and 2002 using a clear conceptual criterion of firms that paid discounted interest rates
below the hypothetical prime rate. CHK found that nearly one-third of the firms in their
sample received this form of financial assistance in late 1990s and early 2000s, which
signified strong evidence for their contention that zombie firms caused “congestion” in
Japan’s marketplace by failing to exit, and thereby hurt healthy firms and overall
economic vitality. CHK tested this hypothesis and discovered that firms identified as
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zombies both reduced productivity in sectors where their presence was higher, and
lowered their more profitable competitors’ investment and employment growth by
impeding the reallocation of capital and human resources. These results led CHK to
argue that zombie firms created deflationary pressures in the wider economy, and
possibly caused some healthy firms to become zombies as well.
The magnitude of CHK’s findings gave the notion of zombie firms much greater
weight, and shaped the ensuing scholarly and policy debates about Japan’s lost decades.
Many economists cited CHK’s zombie firm argument as a persuasive and at least partial
explanation for Japan’s long-term stagnation (Griffin and Odaki 2009; Kobayashi 2009,
339; Garside 2012, 90‒94), while international organizations like the International
Monetary Fund and OECD referenced CHK in calling on Japan to make far-reaching
economic policy reforms (Lam and Shin 2012, 3; Arbatli et al. 2016, 8; OECD 2015, 23).
Moreover, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, central banks like the Bank of
England mentioned CHK in noting that lessons should be drawn from Japan’s extension
of credit support to weak firms during the lost decades (Bank of England 2012, 29‒31),
and leading economic policy voices like former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers
and Liu He, the top economic advisor to Chinese President Xi Jinping, expressed
concern about the need to remove zombie firms from their respective economies
(Summers 2012, 72; Zhongguo xinwen wang 2015). Increased attention by economic
policymakers outside Japan suggests that it has become conventional wisdom that
zombie firms were a prime reason for Japan’s economic malaise after the banking crisis
in the 1990s, and a potential threat to other economies trying to recover after the 2008
crisis.
Notwithstanding the widespread influence of CHK’s study on the idea of zombie
firms, some scholars have questioned the correctness of conceptualizing these troubled
firms on the sole basis of discounted interest rates. Most notably, Fukuda and Nakamura
(2011; 2013) (henceforth “FN”) contended that below-prime rate interest rates are
insufficient to indicate zombie firms, because Japan adopted a quantitative easing
monetary policy in the 2000s that enabled many firms, including healthy ones, to
borrow at very low interest rates, particularly since the policy accelerated competition
between banks and put downward pressure on lending rates. To more accurately gauge
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the presence of zombie firms, FN proposed the addition of two conceptual criteria,
profitability and evergreen lending, to CHK’s interest rate criterion. Based on this
revised definition, FN estimated that the ratio of zombie firms in their sample from the
Tokyo Stock Exchange peaked in 2001 at less than 15 percent of firms ─ a level that
was roughly half of CHK’s estimate ─ and that the ratio subsequently declined and
remained below 5 percent of firms throughout the 2000s until the global financial crisis.
Since FN offered their revised conceptualization, it has quickly gained traction
among economists investigating zombie firms in Japan and elsewhere (Kwon, Narita, and
Narita 2015; Imai 2016; Nie et al. 2016; Tan, Huang, and Woo 2016). This trend suggests that
a consensus may be emerging around the relative merits of FN’s more strenuous
definition, possibly because its additional conceptual criteria help it avoid the Type 1
and Type 2 errors inherent in CHK’s definition, and because its estimate of the zombie
firm ratio more closely tracks the actual amount of nonperforming loans at major
Japanese banks.
FN’s enhancement to CHK’s original conceptualization has reopened the debate
about zombie firms’ role in Japan’s lost decades, and proposes that scholars view the
effects of zombies on Japan’s low growth much more conservatively, especially in the
period after 2001. Nonetheless, while we appreciate the creative significance of CHK’s
landmark argument as well as the enhanced conceptual validity and empirical findings
of FN’s counterargument, we agree with the observation by Imai (2016) that both these
arguments place exclusive emphasis the existence of zombie firms among stock
exchange-listed firms which are typically large enterprises, whereas most businesses in
Japan (and virtually all other economies) are small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)
which do not publicly trade their stock. In Japan’s case, SME have traditionally
constituted more than 99 percent of the total number of firms in the economy, provide
roughly 70 percent of total employment (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010, 6), and
contribute 50 percent of national GDP (Yoshino and Wignaraja 2015). Therefore, the
current debate’s inattention to this important corporate category is a significant
omission, and should be amended to provide fuller understanding of zombies’ place in
Japan’s recent economic history.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the debate about zombie firms in Japan by
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examining the presence of zombies among SME. We have two goals. First, we seek to
identify the ratio of zombie firms among SME in the economy over time using a large
database, the BSJBSA. In attempting this first goal, we estimate the ratio of zombie
firms in basically the same way as CHK and FN, but with this database that gives us
insight into a significant firm category that these previous studies overlook. We are not
the first to examine the zombie ratio among SME, but our use of this database managed
by the Japanese government affords us a much larger sample size for estimating the
ratio compared with earlier research (Imai 2016).
Second, we seek to uncover properties of zombie SME such as survival time in
zombie status. While prior scholarship on zombie firms has addressed the overall
zombie ratio in listed firms and specific sectors, there has been little work to date on the
length of time that zombie firms remain as zombies. One exception is Nakamura (2017,
15), who finds that large zombie enterprises between 1995 to 2008 stayed as zombies
for an average of slightly over two years, a much shorter period than commonly
assumed. We are interested in performing a similar analysis on small firms, and more
generally illuminating the corporate characteristics of zombie SME.
Our pursuit of these goals is especially motivated by our interest in potential
disparities for the SME category that may correlate with small firms’ utilization of
Japan’s credit guarantee system. This system, which was originally established in 1937,
was expanded in 1998 to enhance small businesses’ access to financing from private
banks in the wake of a domestic “credit crunch” and the Asian financial crisis. It grew
to become the largest credit guarantee system in the world during the 2000s in terms of
outstanding obligations (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 2016a, 3), and was notable
in providing high levels of coverage ─ credit guarantees of 80 and 100 percent ─ to
nearly 4 million SME users.
Given that the system’s substantial guarantees significantly reduced banks’
potential default risk, the system stimulated private lending to firms whose
creditworthiness might otherwise have prevented them from access to finance. It also
possibly generated an arrangement conducive to zombie firms, since banks were
encouraged to lend to borrowers with greater likelihood of repayment problems. Thus,
we are interested to know about the zombie firm situation among SME, which could
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indirectly implicate the support function of the credit guarantee system.
III. Data and Method
In our empirical analysis we use the METI Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure
and Activities (BSJBSA). This survey contains data on the conditions of diversification,
globalization, and soft economy of Japanese firms, and is generally used by METI to
inform and learn from its own economic policymaking. It covers firms with 50 or more
employees and whose paid-up capital or investment are higher than \30 million in
industries including mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, food services,
and other service industries. Though the BSJBSA does not include data from
microenterprises, the SME category which contains the most credit guarantee system
users, because the survey encompasses all firms that meet these other size criteria, it
addresses a large range of firms and provides a strong advantage in the context of our
research.
Our basic empirical strategy consists of (i) identifying zombie firms using
BSJBSA micro-data, (ii) investigating the characteristics of these zombie firms, and
(iii) conducting regression analysis on the relationship among the zombie identifier and
other covariates. In step (i), the fundamental task is how to identify zombies. Three
measures have been proposed in the literature. First, CHK parsimoniously define
zombie firms as companies whose interest payments are lower than the hypothetical
risk-free interest payments (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008, 1948). Second, FN add
the criteria of profitability and evergreen lending to CHK’s definition. Profitability is
important, FN argue, because firms with earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) that
exceed the firms’ hypothetical risk-free interest payments are generally healthy, and
such firms’ good financial standing may in fact explain why their interest payments are
lower than what the prime rate would stipulate. Evergreening lending is also relevant,
since financially troubled businesses may have their loans rolled-over by their banks
when they face difficulties with repayment (Fukuda and Nakamura 2011, 1126‒27). Third,
Imai agrees with the FN definition in principle, but uses a longer period to evaluate firm
profitability. This modification helps Imai’s definition avoid the problems of
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
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misidentifying healthy ﬁrms as zombie ﬁrms if the healthy ﬁrms experience temporary
proﬁt declines, and misidentifying zombie ﬁrms as healthy ﬁrms if the zombie ﬁrms
have temporary proﬁt increases (Imai 2016, 94). The definitions are expressed as follows:
I  =r

 *B

 + 15


r  *B +min(r, ⋯., r ) *Bonds 
where I  : minimum required interest, r

 : interest rate,
B  : borrowings from banks,
Bonds : issued amount of corporate bonds
If I <I

 , the firm is regarded as zombie (CHK criterion)
where I : actual interest paid
If I  >PROF and B

  >B

 , the firm is regarded as zombie
(FN criterion)
where PROF: profit before interest and taxes
If 


(PROF)<0, and B

  >B

 the firm is regarded as zombie
(Imai criterion)
Our analysis compares the zombie characteristics reported by each of these
measures. Table 1 provides descriptive summary statistics for our data.
IV. Results
Identification and Comparison of Zombie Firm Ratios by Different Definitions
Figure 1 shows the zombie firm ratios according to the respective definitions of
CHK, FN and Imai, which are calculated as a percentage of all firms in our sample. The
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Figure 1. Zombie Ratios by Definition
Note: Unit is percentage
Source: Authors
end year of the sample period is fiscal year 2014, but the start year for each definition’s
estimate is different: 2009 for CHK, 2010 for FN, and 2012 for Imai. Short-term and
long-term bank borrowing and corporate bond issuance amounts are used to identify
zombie firms, but the BSJBSA only begins covering this data from 2009. In addition,
the start year is delayed for the FN calculation because it considers differences with the
borrowing amount in the previous year, and for the Imai calculation which uses
multiple year earnings (three years in this paper) to identify zombie firms.
Four points can be observed in Figure 1. First, the CHK definition classifies many
more firms as zombies than do the other two definitions. Second, the FN and Imai
definitions elicit a comparable zombie ratio, though the Imai definition’s ratio is
slightly lower. These two points are similar to the findings of Imai (2016). Third, while
the zombie ratio continues to decrease in both the FN and Imai definitions, the ratio in
the CHK definition continues to rise, suggesting that the respective estimates of the
CHK definition and the FN and Imai definitions not only have a level gap, but also
move in different directions.
The biggest reason for this divergence is that the CHK definition uses the real
payment rate, whereas the FN and Imai definitions use revenue. Since both CHK and
FN/Imai compare these different indicators with an “ideal payment rate” based on the
prime rate, their definitions elicit starkly dissimilar zombie ratios. On the one hand, real
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payment rates and revenues may be linked. In particular, from the viewpoint of the
business cycle, corporate earnings typically worsen during economic recessions, and
real payment rates also decrease in response to reductions in policy interest rates. Yet
what is decisively different is that in normal bank behavior related to credit risk, firms
with low profits should have high interest rates. With the CHK definition, however,
zombie firms may not only be weak firms that receive preferential interest rate
treatment, but also sound businesses with favorable interest rates based on normal
examination criteria. By contrast, the FN and Imai definitions use fundamental
corporate earnings, so they more accurately capture underlying corporate strength.
Because the Imai definition also takes into account temporal fluctuations caused by
special factors, we prefer to use it in this paper.
Our study is limited in that it examines data on short-term and long-term bank
borrowing which the BSJBSA only started to collect from 2009. However, the BSJBSA
also contains earlier data on current and fixed liabilities which are closely related to
bank borrowing. Current liabilities consist of short-term bank loans, borrowings from
other financial institutions, and inter-company liabilities (accounts payable). Fixed
liabilities include long-term bank loans, borrowings from other financial institutions,
corporate bonds, and intercompany receivables (accounts receivable). Regardless of firm
size, firms’ largest liabilities tend to be bank borrowing (Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency 2016, 285). Here, we calculate the value corresponding to the zombie firm ratio
using current and fixed liabilities as proxy variables of bank borrowing. However, since
this is a reference value by proxy variables, it is important to note that it is not the
zombie ratio itself.
Figure 2 compares the original value using bank borrowing and the estimated
value using current and fixed liabilities for the CHK, FN, and Imai definitions. It shows
that the ratio based on the CHK definition is very different, while the gap between the
FN and Imai ratios is small and their time series changes are similar. As mentioned
earlier, this paper prefers the Imai definition of zombie firms, which it judges to be
meaningful in analyzing long-term data based on estimated values for current and fixed
liabilities.
Based on this understanding, Figure 3 shows the trend of estimated values based
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Figure 2. Calculated Zombie Ratios by Types of Debt
(b) FN Definition
(c) CHK Definition
Note: Unit is percentage
Source: Authors
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Figure 3. Debt-Based Zombie Ratios
Note: Unit is percentage
Source: Authors
on current and fixed liabilities (hereafter referred to as debt-based values). It is clear that the
trend is quite different between the CHK and FN/Imai ratios. First, there is a large
disparity between the CHK ratio (shown on right axis), and the FN/Imai ratios as the
baseline level. The three ratios initially exhibit parallel movement until the mid-2000s,
with the values according to each definition gradually declining from the mid-1990s
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Figure 4. Zombie Ratio by Firm Size
(b) FN Definition
(c) CHK Definition
Note: Unit is percentage
Source: Authors
(when the data begins) over the ensuing ten years. From the mid-2000s onward, however,
there is a noticeable disparity. The CHK ratio rapidly soars again to a high level,
whereas the FN/Imai ratios increase once after 2008 before falling again, and remain
close to each other during the mid-2000s.
Characteristics of Zombie Firms
In this section we investigate the relationship between different corporate
attributes and the zombie ratio using the Imai definition. First, Figure 4 shows the
zombie ratio by firm size according to capitalization. Small SME have less than￥100
million in equity capital, medium-sized SME have between ￥100 million and ￥1
billion in equity capital, and large firms have more than ￥1 billion in equity capital.
The results show that the zombie ratios for the two SME categories are uniformly
higher than the ratio for large firms. This finding is consistent with Imai (2016) and
corroborates the argument that smaller-sized firms have a greater tendency to be zombie
firms, a possibility that was not examined in the original CHK study on zombie firms
which looked only at large enterprises.
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Figure 5. Zombie Ratios of Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Industries
Note: Unit is percentage
Source: Authors
Next, Figure 5 depicts the situation in Japan’s manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries. It shows that the manufacturing industry contains a higher
zombie firm ratio than the non-manufacturing industry. This figure is based on the Imai
definition, yet the same outcome is also observed with the CHK and FN definitions.
However, care is needed in interpreting these results, since the BSJBSA widely covers
the manufacturing industry but is still in the process of expanding its coverage of the
non-manufacturing industry. Additionally, it does not include data for microenterprises,
many of which are in the non-manufacturing industry, so there is a high possibility of
bias. Therefore, while it is possible to point out that many zombie firms exist in the
manufacturing industry, one must be cautious about claiming that the ratio is higher for
this industry than for the non-manufacturing industry.
Figure 6 shows the zombie ratio by specific industry sector. It includes 22 sectors
based on SNA classification. Manufacturers of material and consumer goods are
noticeable as two sectors with high zombie ratios. Results for the non-manufacturing
industry require careful evaluation for the reasons stated above.
Finally, Figure 7 shows the ratio by firm age. Here, firm age is defined as the
elapsed years since the establishment year. In all definitions including the Imai
definition, the zombie ratio increases as firm age increases. Table 2 shows this from
another angle. When the average age of zombie firms and non-zombie firms are
calculated by each definition, zombie firms are found to be older. From Figure 7 and
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Figure 6. Zombie Ratios by Industry Sector
Note: Unit is percentage
Source: Authors
Table 2, we see that there is a positive correlation between zombie formation and age.
Regression Results
Based on the above results, we conduct a regression analysis on zombie firms.
First, we estimate the probability of a firm’s identification as a zombie using a panel
logit model, with a dummy dependent variable taking the value of “1” if the firm is a
zombie and “0” if it is not. Table 3 shows the results of the fixed effect model selected
by Hausmann’s test. As expected, the value of the variable representing the business
situation (ROA in this case) is predominantly negative. However, both firm size (log of
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(a) Imai Definition
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Figure 7. Zombie Ratios by Firm Age
(b) FN Definition
(c) CHK Definition
Note: Unit is percentage
Source: Authors
Table 2. Average Age of Zombie and Non-Zombie Firms
43.3044.2345.64average age (years)
not zombies
Imai FN CHK
46.8549.2552.12average age (years)
zombies
76,886107,79572,275# of firms (firms)
40,6046,6232,608# of firms (firms)
(b) with industry dummies
sample period: 2013-2014
(a) without industry dummies
S.D. p-value Coef. S.D. p-value
roa -6.7166 0.8591 0.0000 -6.9195 0.8715 0.0000
capital (log) 0.0696 0.1988
Coef.
0.7260 0.0498 0.1974 0.8010
age -0.0005 0.0185 0.9780 -0.0005 0.0186 0.9770
year dummies Yes Yes
industry dummies No Yes
log likelihood -1840.3 -1829.9
p-value, LR chi2 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 7514 7514
# of groups 1932 1932
dep. var.:
Imai-zombie dummy
Table 3. Regression Result by Fixed-Effect Panel Logit Model
capital amount) and firm age (elapsed years since establishment year) are not significant.
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dep. var.: sample period: 2010-2014
roa S.D. p-value
capital (log) 0.0017 0.0002 0.0000
age -0.0004 0.0000
Coef.
0.0000
cons. -0.0486 0.0118 0.0000
year dummies Yes
industry dummies Yes
F (27,151096) 121.17
adj. R
2
0.0210
# of obs. 151124
Table 4. OLS Results for ROA on Firm Size and Age
These results are logical because firms’ business conditions largely center on
profit, a factor which strongly influences the probability of zombie formation.
Furthermore, as firms increase in size, firms with higher profits increase, while as firm
age increases, profitability tends to decline. In fact, this tendency is easily confirmed by
OLS (Table 4).
Based on these results, it is clear that the probability of zombie formation is not
simply determined by a firm being a SME or having high age, but rather by its business
conditions. In other words, there is no reason why zombie formation is only possible
among large firms.
Initially, academic and policy interest in zombie firms was based on the notion that
firms with poor prospects for revival were greatly prolonging their lives. Next, we
examine this issue of survival in zombie status. When we look at the parameter of the
lagged variable (L1.crit_Imai) indicating that a firm was identified as a zombie in the
previous term, we see that it is significantly negative (Table 5). This means that if a firm
holds zombie status in one period, its probability of keeping zombie status in the next
period decreases. This result is somewhat surprising, given that zombie firms are
commonly portrayed as entities with excessive longevity. It suggests that firms that are
identified as zombies do not endure in zombie status endlessly, and that many zombie
firms return to a healthy situation. While we omit detailed explanation, these regression
results based on the Imai definition of zombie firms are similarly established with the
FN definition (Table 6).
We should emphasize that the results in Table 5 are only for firms that continue
their survival in this term. In fact, there is a possibility that firms that were zombies in
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0.00000.1323-2.5112Imai-zombie dummy (-1)
dep. var.: sample period: 2010-2014
Imai-zombie dummy
# of obs. 4225
S.D. p-value
roa -6.7494 1.1085 0.0000
capital (log) -0.0229 0.2163
Coef.
0.9160
age 0.0026 0.0313 0.9340
year dummies Yes
industry dummies Yes
log likelihood -934.9
p-value, LR chi2 0.000
# of groups 1420
Table 5. FE Panel Logit Model with Lagged Identification Dummy
14697# of obs.
FN-zombie dummy
sample period: 2010-2014dep. var.:
FN-zombie dummy (-1) -1.3433 0.0547 0.0000
Coef.
0.1618-0.0957capital (log)
0.00000.9390-31.4976roa
p-valueS.D.
Yesyear dummies
0.10600.0114-0.0185age
0.5540
-4084.6log likelihood
Yesindustry dummies
3683# of groups
0.000p-value, LR chi2
Table 6. FE Panel Logit Model for FN Definition
the previous term have exited this term. However, these firms drop out as a target of
regression analysis. Therefore, it should be noted that bias exists in a positive direction
when current term zombie status is used as the dependent variable.
Until now, our results have been strictly based on the same definitions and types of
data used in the original studies by CHK (2008), FN (2011), and Imai (2016). However,
this stringency limits the period of our analysis, because the BSJBSA only contains data
on borrowing from banks after 2009. We therefore use similar data to make proxy
variables and extend the sample period, substituting current debt for short-term
borrowing from banks and fixed debt for long-term borrowing from banks. These
changes allow us to make 1995 the start year for identification with the CHK and FN
definitions, and 1997 the start year with the Imai definition. We call this modified
approach the “debt-based” definition, and show the results in Tables 7 and 8. It seems
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0.16100.02310.03240.19400.02060.0267capital (log)
(a) benchmark
sample period: 1997-2014
(b) with a lag of dep. var.
Coef.
Imai-zombie dummy (-1)
0.00000.1730-9.01220.00000.1531-8.7043roa
p-valueS.D.Coef.p-valueS.D.
Yesyear dummies
0.00500.00140.00390.00000.00120.0048age
0.00000.0158-0.1546
-49459.9-59264.9log likelihood
YesYesindustry dummies
Yes
# of groups
150140195964# of obs.
0.0000.000p-value, LR chi2
Imai-zombie dummy
dep. var.:
1534317513
Table 7. FE Panel Logit Model for Debt-Based Imai Definition
(b) with a lag of dep. var.
sample period: 1995-2014
(a) benchmark
capital (log) 0.0740 0.0155 0.0000 0.0435 0.0168 0.0100
S.D. p-value Coef. S.D. p-value
roa -8.2200 0.1068 0.0000 -8.2080 0.1169 0.0000
FN-zombie dummy (-1)
Coef.
-0.1187 0.0119 0.0000
age 0.0006 0.0009 0.5280 0.0013 0.0010 0.2190
year dummies Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes
log likelihood -109728.2 -93826.9
p-value, LR chi2 0.000 0.000
# of obs. 338920 293629
# of groups 27617 24990
dep. var.:
FN-zombie dummy
Table 8. FE Panel Logit Model for Debt-Based FN Definition
that the major characteristics of the former results hold.
In addition to escaping from zombie status, it also possible that many zombie firms
exit the marketplace entirely. Here we investigate this “exit” event itself. Since the
BSJBSA does not collect information on market exit by firms, we regard the firms that
do not report their data thereafter as having exited. We should note that this
identification strategy possibly includes firms that simply quit answering the survey in
later years.
Table 9 and 10 are the results of regressions which make exit the dependent
variable (represented as dummy variable which takes “1” if a firm exits). Both tables show
that if a firm becomes a zombie, the probability of exit significantly increases.
Additionally, having a longer duration of zombie status heightens exit probability.
As expected, as the size of firm (log of capital amount) becomes larger, the
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0.00000.0761-0.59040.00000.0819-0.5486capital (log)
(a) using zombie dummy
sample period: 1997-2014
(b) using zombie years
Imai-zombie years
Coef.
0.05440.1589Imai-zombie dummy
0.00000.1883-0.94060.00000.2000-0.8449roa
p-valueS.D.Coef.p-valueS.D.
Yesyear dummies
0.00000.01020.60810.00000.01070.6053age
0.0040
-9175.4-6952.9log likelihood
YesYesindustry dummies
Yes
# of groups
9641181891# of obs.
0.0000.000p-value, LR chi2
exit (+1)
dep. var.:
1452513078
0.0911 0.0290 0.0020
Table 9. FE Panel Logit Model for Exit and Imai Definition-Zombie
Table 10. FE Panel Logit Model for Exit and FN Definition-Zombie
FN-zombie years
0.00000.0560-0.39390.00000.0560-0.3937capital (log)
(a) using zombie dummy
sample period: 1995-2014
(b) using zombie years
Coef.
0.03680.0727FN-zombie dummy
0.00000.1625-1.13460.00000.1635-1.1411roa
p-valueS.D.Coef.p-valueS.D.
Yesyear dummies
0.00000.00780.50280.00000.00780.5029age
0.0480
-13310.6-13312.1log likelihood
YesYesindustry dummies
Yes
# of groups
142669142669# of obs.
0.0000.000p-value, LR chi2
0.00900.02420.0635
exit (+1)
dep. var.:
2021420214
probability of exit decreases. This is not surprising considering that smaller firms have
higher credit risk. However, regression by segmented size groups shows us quite
another aspect. We divide firms into two size groups, SME and large firms. Table 11
shows that becoming a zombie significantly increases the probability of exit in SME,
while the parameter is smaller in large firms.
We also compare the business situations of zombies and non-zombies around the
timing of exit. Table 12 shows the results of logistic regression in which the dependent
variable is a dummy with the value “1” if employees of the firm decrease within the
five-year period before a firm’s market exit. We can see that the probability of reducing
employees increases if the firm is a zombie among small firms, while there is not such
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Table 11. FE Panel Logit Model for Exit by Firm Size
0.79600.31000.08020.00100.1134-0.3893capital (log)
(a) SME
sample period: 1997-2012
(b) large firms
Coef.
0.05750.1604Imai-zombie dummy
0.09200.6654-1.12080.00000.2038-0.7451roa
p-valueS.D.Coef.p-valueS.D.
Yesyear dummies
0.00000.04060.70590.00000.01160.6393age
0.63000.20590.09920.0050
-586.9-6119.0log likelihood
YesYesindustry dummies
Yes
# of groups
724173234# of obs.
0.0000.000p-value, LR chi2
FN-zombie dummy
dep. var.:
108811909
Table 12. Logit Model for Employee Decrease by Firm Size
0.21300.0769-0.09580.00000.0315-0.1670capital (log)
(a) SME
sample period: 1997-2012, group: firms which will exit in next year
(b) large
dep. var.:
workers-decrease (in 5yrs)
dummy
age 0.0181
Coef.
0.08350.3079Imai-zombie dummy
0.00100.9372-3.08870.00000.3648-3.2518roa
p-valueS.D.Coef.p-valueS.D.
Yesyear dummies
0.13600.71791.07140.00000.20751.1636cons.
0.93900.25670.01950.0000
-455.8-3902.9log likelihood
YesYesindustry dummies
Yes
# of obs.
0.1060.072pseudo R
2
0.0000.000p-value, LR chi2
7577237
0.0018 0.0000 0.0163 0.0042 0.0000
Table 13. Logit Model for Sales Decrease by Firm Size
0.0136age
dummy
profit-decrease (in 5yrs)
dep. var.:
(b) large
sample period: 1997-2012, group: firms which will exit in next year
(a) SME
capital (log) -0.2195 0.0316 0.0000 -0.0524 0.0775 0.4990
S.D. p-value Coef. S.D. p-value
roa -7.3623 0.4487 0.0000 -6.4365 1.1156 0.0000
Imai-zombie dummy 0.4064 0.0866
Coef.
0.0000 -0.1506 0.2533 0.5520
cons. 1.9976 0.2124 0.0000 1.2051 0.7261 0.0970
year dummies Yes Yes
industry dummies Yes Yes
log likelihood -3864.5 -447.8
p-value, LR chi2 0.000 0.000
pseudo R
2
0.101 0.133
# of obs.
0.00200.00420.01280.00000.0018
7237 754
tendency among large firms. Table 13 shows a similar result, using sales instead of
employees.
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V. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the situation of zombie firms among Japanese SME with
data from the BSJBSA. Our analysis covers a much larger sample of SME than
previous studies, and addresses multiple characteristics of zombie SME, including firm
size, firm age, duration in zombie status, market exit, and corporate activity at the time
of exit.
Our findings reveal that though there remains some discrepancy over the zombie
firm ratio based on different definitional criteria, according to the preferred Imai
definition, Japanese SME contained a non-negligible amount of zombie firms during
the lost decades. While chronological limitations in our data prevent us from directly
estimating the zombie ratio before 2009, the proxy variable of current and fixed
liabilities (what we call the “debt-based” zombie ratio) shows that, throughout the 2000s, a
minimum of 10 percent of all firms in our sample were zombie firms. This finding
suggests that zombies existed to a significant degree during this period, and at a
comparably higher level than large-sized zombie firms estimated in other studies
(Nakamura 2017). In other words, our analysis implies that CHK’s original study may
have been intuitively correct about zombie firms’ presence in the post-bubble Japanese
economy, but that its focus on listed firms was misplaced. To the extent that zombie
firms existed in the lost decades, especially in the 2000s, they were a greater problem
among SME.
Our paper makes an additional contribution in elucidating multiple corporate
characteristics of zombie SME. Our findings in this area include: (1) zombie firms
often escape from zombie status through recovery or exit, rather than perpetually
keeping zombie status; (2) the probability of exit is higher for zombies that are SME;
and (3) exiting zombies’ economic performance is worse than that of exiting non-
zombies. Certainly, firms’ exit, economic performance and zombie status are
endogenous, but identifying zombies might offer an effective signal in the view of
finance and economic policy.
Taken together, our findings carry two general implications for the study of
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zombie firms going forward. First, it is important that research on zombie firms
considers SME as well as large firms. Recent studies on Europe and South Korea have
extended the debate on zombie firms beyond Japan, but some include SME (McGowan,
Andrews, and Millot 2017) while others do not (Acharya et al. 2017). Data restrictions may
complicate comprehensive analysis, but as this paper shows, SME are a significant
corporate class where the possible presence of zombies should not be underappreciated.
Second, comparisons between different corporate categories might indirectly
expose the presence of alternative mechanisms behind the generation of zombie firms.
While the nature of BSJBSA data prevented this paper from testing the proposition that
Japan’s credit guarantee system supported zombie firms among Japanese SME, the
finding of a high zombie ratio among small firms during the 2000s suggests that these
zombies were underpinned by factors that did not similarly affect large firms. Future
work should specifically examine the situation of firms using the credit guarantee
system to determine whether the system was responsible for generating zombie SME.
This could be a key lesson from Japan for scholars and policymakers concerned with
zombie firms.
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